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—I Cultural	  Studies	  has	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  strangers	  that	  goes	  something	  like	  this.	  First,	   it	   posits	   that	   we	   used	   to	   live	   in	   homogeneous,	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   communities	   in	  which	   we	   knew	   each	   other	   more	   or	   less	   intimately	   and	   strangers	   were	   readily	  identifiable	   outsiders;	   now,	   we	   live	   in	   communities	   of	   a	   different	   scale	   and	   mix	  where	   we	   are	   all	   structurally	   strangers	   to	   each	   other.	   (This	   is	   a	   restatement	   of	  Tönnies	   distinction	   between	   Gemeinschaft,	   community,	   and	   Gesellschaft,	   society.)1	  Second,	   it	  goes	  on	  to	  propose	  that	  our	  former	  habits	  of	  sociability	  and	  suspicion	  of	  strangers	  persist	  and	  are	  dysfunctional,	  tending	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  forced	  homogeneities	  and	  an	  ethnically-­‐based	  politics	  of	  identity	  which	  undermine	  the	  political	  imperative	  of	   living	  with	  difference.	  Finally,	   it	  concludes	  that	  a	  cosmopolitan	  politics	  based	  on	  welcoming	  heterogeneity	  and	  overcoming	  parochial	  narrowness	  is	  the	  only	  ethically	  and	  pragmatically	  viable	  way	  of	  coping	  with	  the	  constitutive	  role	  of	  the	  stranger	  in	  our	  world.	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Now,	   I	  don’t	  necessarily	  disagree	  with	  any	  of	   these	  propositions	  and	  much	  of	  the	  argument	  is	  probably	  even	  true;	  but	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  write	  the	  article	  that	  would	  embody	   this	   argument,	   because	   I	   disagree	   with	   some	   of	   its	   assumptions.	   In	  particular,	   I	   note	   that	   it	   depends	   upon	   positing	   an	   ‘us’	   who	   do	   or	   don’t	   welcome	  ‘them’,	  the	  strangers;	  I	  myself	  am	  not	  positioned	  as	  a	  stranger	  in	  this	  argument.	  This	  means	  that	   it	  doesn’t	  really	  come	  to	   terms	  with	   the	  reality	  of	  a	  world	   in	  which	  we	  are	  all	  each	  other’s	  strangers,	  or	  rather	  where	  familiarity	  and	  strangeness	  constantly	  intermingle	  and	  the	  positions	  of	  native	  and	  stranger	  change	  depending	  on	  context.	  And	   it	   accepts	   the	   historical	   reality	   of	   the	   homogeneous,	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   community.	  These	  are	  assumptions	  I’d	  like	  at	  least	  to	  unsettle.	  I	  begin	  my	  actual	  article,	  then,	  by	  talking	   about	   notions	   of	   the	   settled	   and	   the	   unsettled:	   that	   is,	   with	   the	   idea	   of	  settlement	   in	   each	   of	   its	   three	  major	   senses:	   as	   a	  place	   of	   human	   habitation;	   as	   a	  fixed	   and	   stable	   order	   of	   habitation;	   and	   as	   a	   political	   consensus	   reconciling	  fractious	  groups.	  For	  precise	  historical	  reasons	  that	  I	  shall	  clarify	  shortly,	  I	  take	  the	  parish,	  rather	  than	  the	  village,	  as	  a	  figure	  of	  settlement	  in	  the	  first	  two	  of	  these	  senses.	  A	  parish	  is	  an	   ecclesiastical	   administrative	   unit,	   traditionally	   covering	   roughly	   the	   area	   of	   a	  European	   village;	   it	   gives	   rise	   to	   terms	   and	   phrases	   such	   as	   ‘parochial’	   and	   ‘the	  parish	   pump’	   which	   indicate	   something	   of	   the	   narrowness	   and	   mundaneness	   we	  associate	   with	   it.	   The	   English	   word	   ‘parish’	   is	   ultimately	   derived	   from	   the	   Greek	  
paroikos,	   made	   up	   of	   para	   +	   oikos,	   ‘dwelling	   beside	   or	   near,	   neighbouring’,	   which	  becomes	   the	   Hellenistic	   Greek	   paroikia,	   ‘dwelling	   temporarily	   or	   sojourning	   in	   a	  foreign	  land’:	  an	  expatriate	  community,	  a	  gathering	  of	  strangers.	  In	  the	  Septuagint	  it	  refers	  to	  the	  Jewish	  diaspora,	  and	  in	  the	  New	  Testament	  to	  earthly	   life	  understood	  as	   a	   temporary	   dwelling.	   It	   acquires	   its	   present	   meaning,	   an	   administrative	   sub-­‐division	   of	   the	   church,	   in	   the	   fourth	   century	   AD.	   Paradoxically,	   then,	   it	   begins	   its	  existence	   with	   a	   meaning	   that	   is	   at	   least	   partly	   counter	   to	   its	   later	   usage	   as	   the	  centre	  of	  known	  life	  and	  the	  place	  to	  which	  one	  is	  born.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  the	  parish	  derives	  its	  social	  and	  figurative	  resonance	  in	  the	  English-­‐speaking	  world	   from	  the	  administrative	   functions	  given	   it	  by	   the	  Elizabethan	  poor	  laws	   of	   1598	   and	   1601.	   These	   laws	   established	   a	   national	   system	   of	   poor	   relief	  delivered	  and	  overseen	  at	  this	  local	  level	  where	  personal	  and	  impersonal	  modes	  of	  giving	   are	   fused;	   as	   Hindle	   puts	   it,	   ‘the	   novelty	   of	   the	   late	   sixteenth-­‐century	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legislation	   lay	   …	   in	   the	   incorporation	   of	   ancient	   principles	   of	   charity	   into	   a	   rate-­‐funded	   administrative	   system	   that	   placed	   a	   legal	   obligation	   on	   each	   parish	   to	  supplement	  the	   incomes	  of	   those	  whose	   idleness	  was	   involuntary’.2	  The	   legislation	  is	   part	   of	   the	   developing	   system	   of	   centralised	   but	   devolved	   state	   administration	  that	  Foucault	  calls	  governmentality,	  and	  it	  works	  by	  defining	  community	  obligations	  by	   way	   of	   opposition	   to	   the	   stranger.	   Indeed,	   you	   could	   say	   that	   its	   politics	   of	  belonging	  depends	  upon	  the	  creation	  of	   its	  own	  class	  of	  strangers,	  since	  the	  Tudor	  poor	  laws,	  largely	  governed	  by	  policy	  towards	  law	  and	  order,3	  inextricably	  combine	  the	  functions	  of	  providing	  relief	  and	  harrying	  vagrancy.	  As	  Raymond	  Williams	  notes:	  Much	  of	  the	  actual	  purpose	  of	  the	   laws	  against	  vagrancy	  was	  to	  force	  the	  landless	   to	  work	   for	  wages,	   in	   the	  new	  organization	  of	   the	  economy.	  But	  this	   was	   rationalized,	   through	   the	   organization	   of	   relief	   on	   a	   parochial	  basis,	  as	  the	  duty	  of	  people	  to	  care	  for	  their	  own,	  for	  their	  neighbours;	  but	  then	  only	  for	  their	  own.	  The	  idea	  of	  settlement,	  and	  then	  of	  paternal	  care,	  was	   counterposed	   to	   the	   ideas	   of	   mobility,	   of	   the	   wandering	   ‘sturdy	  rogues’,	  the	  free	  labourers.4	  These	  laws	  follow	  a	  long	  mediaeval	  history	  of	   licences	  and	  certificates—essentially	  internal	   passports—which	   regulated	   the	   mobility	   of	   labour	   and	   of	   potential	  dissidents,	   and	   required	   even	   retrenched	   retainers	   and	   discharged	   soldiers	   and	  sailors	   to	   have	   passes	   to	   cross	   the	   country	   to	   their	   own	   parish.5	   The	   new	   regime	  consolidates	   the	   parish	   as	   the	   place	   of	   legal	   settlement,	   and	   thereby,	   in	   a	   social	  Imaginary	   that	   persists	   for	   centuries,	   as	   a	   stable	   focus	   of	   familiar	   ways	   of	   doing	  things	  and	  of	  organic	  and	  reciprocal	  social	  relations.	  The	  parish	  feeds	  and	  buries	  its	  own,	   but	   its	   code	   of	   hospitality	   requires	   the	   stranger—whoever	   is	   not	   born	   and	  settled	  in	  the	  parish—to	  pass	  on	  to	  his	  own	  parish,	  or	  to	  be	  an	  outcast	  within.	  ‘Settlement’	   in	   this	   simultaneously	   legal	   and	   social	   sense	   is	   always	  difficult	   to	  define	   accurately	   because	   populations	   never	   stay	   still.	   Birth	   or	   marriage	   are	   the	  primary	  qualifications,	  but	  a	  series	  of	   laws	  from	  the	  fifteenth	  century	  onwards	  add	  others	  based	  on	  property	  and	  residence.	  These	  are	  codified	  in	  the	  Poor	  Relief	  Act	  of	  1662,6	  which	  notoriously	  makes	  it	  legal	  to	  expel	  people	  without	  a	  settlement	  in	  the	  parish	  on	  the	  mere	  suspicion	  that	  they	  might	  become	  a	  charge	  upon	  the	  rates.	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The	  settled	  man	  or	  woman	  and	  the	  vagrant,	  the	  wanderer,	  are	  thus	  defined	  by	  their	  mutual	   opposition;	   each	   depends	   for	   its	   identity	   on	   the	   other.	  Melling	   notes	  that:	  The	  Quarter	  Session	  records	  in	  Kent	  contain	  many	  references	  …	  to	  paupers	  being	  ‘settled	  and	  provided	  for’	  in	  a	  certain	  parish,	  to	  a	  pauper	  being	  sent	  to	  ‘the	  place	  of	  his	  last	  legal	  settlement’,	  or	  to	  there	  being	  no	  obligation	  on	  a	  parish	  to	  relieve	  a	  child	  it	  being	  ‘neither	  born	  nor	  settled’	  in	  a	  particular	  parish.	   The	   justices	   in	   Kent	   made	   frequent	   orders	   for	   the	   removal	   of	  paupers	  from	  one	  parish	  to	  another.7	  	  Here	  are	  two	  examples	  of	  court	  rulings	  from	  seventeenth-­‐century	  Kent:	  a)	  Whereas	  Philipp	  North	  was	  taken	  vagrant	  at	  Gillingham	  in	  this	  countie	  and	   was	   whipped	   and	   by	   order	   of	   the	   justices	   of	   the	   peace	   of	   the	   said	  countie	  was	   sent	   to	  Feversham	   in	   the	   said	   countie,	  where	  he	  was	  borne,	  according	   to	   the	  statute	   in	   that	  case	  provided	  and	  being	  by	  vertue	  of	   the	  said	   order	   and	   warrant	   of	   the	   said	   justices	   delivered	   at	   Feversham,	  aforesaid,	   to	   the	   churchwardens	   and	   overseeres	   there	   to	   be	   kept	   and	  provided	   for	   according	   to	   lawe,	   the	   said	   churchwardens	   and	   overseeres	  did	   refuse	   to	   receive	   the	   said	   North	   contrary	   to	   the	   statute	   in	   that	   case	  provided	  and	  uppon	  receipt	  he,	  the	  said	  North,	  by	  vertue	  of	  the	  said	  order	  of	  the	  said	  justices,	  was	  whipped	  by	  the	  order	  of	  the	  mayor	  of	  Feversham	  and	  sent	  back	  to	  Gillingham,	  aforesaid,	  contrary	  to	  law,	  where	  it	  is	  ordered	  by	   this	   court	   that	   the	   said	   Phillipp	   North	   be	   forthwith	   sent	   back	   to	  Feversham,	   aforesaid,	   there	   to	   be	   kept	   and	   to	   remayne,	   according	   to	   the	  forme	  of	  the	  statute	  in	  that	  case	  made	  and	  provided.8	  b)	   Whereas	   George	   Smith,	   Mary	   Smith	   and	   Eve	   Smith,	   three	   poore	  children,	   the	   eldest	   of	   them	   not	   being	   above	   six	   yeares	   old,	   by	   force	   or	  colour	  of	  pass	  bearing	  date	  the	  nineth	  day	  of	  December	  in	  the	  yeare	  of	  our	  Lord,	   one	   thousand	   six	   hundred	   ninety	   and	   eight,	   under	   the	   hands	   and	  scales	   of	   two	   justices	   of	   the	   peace	   of	   Southampton,	   were	   sent	   and	  conveyed	   from	   constable	   to	   constable	   and	   from	   officer	   to	   officer	   from	  Southampton,	  by	  and	  thro’	  the	  county	  of	  Kent,	  unto	  the	  city	  and	  county	  of	  Canterbury	   and	   soe	   after,	   by	  warrant	  under	   the	  hands	   and	   scales	   of	   two	  justices	  of	  the	  peace	  of	  Canterbury,	  were	  sent	  back	  again	  to	  Southampton	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and	   soe	   have	   been	   sent	   from	   Southampton	   to	   Canterbury	   through	   this	  county	   eight	   severall	   times	   and	   are	   likely	   to	   bee	   soe	   sent	   forwards	   and	  backwards	  during	  their	  lives,	  to	  the	  greate	  and	  apparent	  wrong	  of	  the	  said	  children	   and	   the	   charge	   of	   the	   countryes	   thro’	   which	   they	   pass	   and	  repasse,	   contrary	   to	   all	   law	   and	   reason,	   unless	   some	   course	   be	   taken	   to	  prevent	  the	  same	  for	  the	  future;	  wee	  therefore	  his	  Majestie’s	  justices	  of	  the	  peace	  for	  the	  said	  county	  of	  Kent,	  being	  desirous	  as	  much	  as	  in	  us	  lyes	  to	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  soe	  greate	  a	  mischiefe,	  have	  at	  our	  said	  sessions	  examined	  the	  case	   and	   doe	   find	   that	   the	   first	   sending	   of	   the	   said	   three	   children	   was	  Southampton	   to	   Canterbury	   by	   force	   of	   the	   said	   pass	  …	  which	   said	   first	  sending	   wee	   conceive	   to	   be	   utterly	   unlawfull,	   neither	   can	   wee	   upon	  examinacion	  find	  any	  reason	  why	  they	  should	  be	  sent	  to	  Canterbury	  where	  they	   have	   noe	   father,	   mother	   nor	   any	   relacion	   that	   wee	   can	   heare	   of,	  neither	  were	  they	  or	  any	  of	  them	  ever	  at	  Canterbury	  before	  they	  were	  sent	  as	  aforesaid.	  It	  is	  therefore	  hereby	  ordered…9	  The	   three	   little	  Smith	  children,	  having	  endured	   the	  bureaucratic	  nightmare	  of	  being	  ceaselessly	  passed	  back	  and	  forth	  between	  the	  two	  cities,	  are	  prevented	  from	  being	  further	  returned	  to	  Canterbury,	  where	  they	  have	  no	  family—although	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  they	  do	  have	  family	  in	  Southampton	  and	  one	  can	  suspect	  that	  the	  Kentish	  magistrates	  may	  be	  motivated	  simply	  by	  a	  desire	  to	  keep	  the	  children	  out	  of	  the	  county.	  The	  parish	  in	  which	  the	  vagrant	  Philip	  North	  is	  legally	  settled	  is	  required	  to	  have	  the	  care	  of	  him	  in	  order	  that	  he	  may	  cease	  to	  be	  a	  vagrant—a	  displaced	  or	  placeless	   person,	   a	   taxonomic	   anomaly.	   In	   each	   of	   these	   cases	   settlement	   is	   a	  problem	  rather	  than	  the	  organic	  status	  that	  the	  law	  takes	  it	  to	  be.	  It	   is	   the	   ambivalence	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   settlement	   that	   Raymond	   Williams	  foregrounds	  in	  his	  extended	  analysis,	  in	  The	  Country	  and	  the	  City,	  of	  its	  affective	  hold	  and	   its	   foreclosure	  of	   the	  place	  of	   the	  Other	   in	   its	  constitution.	   ‘Around	  the	   idea	  of	  settlement’,	  he	  writes,	  ‘a	  real	  structure	  of	  values	  has	  grown.	  It	  draws	  on	  many	  deep	  and	  persistent	  feelings:	  an	  identification	  with	  the	  people	  among	  whom	  we	  grew	  up;	  an	  attachment	  to	  the	  place,	  the	  landscape,	  in	  which	  we	  first	  lived	  and	  learned	  to	  see.’	  Williams	  then	  relates	  this	  to	  his	  own	  feelings	  by	  shifting	  to	  talking	  about	  the	  village	  where	  he	  grew	  up:	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When	  I	  go	  back	  to	  that	  country,	  I	  feel	  a	  recovery	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  life,	  which	   appears,	   at	   times,	   as	   an	   inescapable	   identity,	   a	   more	   positive	  connection	  than	  I	  have	  known	  elsewhere.	  Many	  other	  men	  feel	  like	  this,	  of	  their	  own	  native	  places,	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  settlement,	  old	  and	  new,	  is	  then	  positive	  and	  unquestioned.	  But	  the	  problem	  has	  always	  been,	  for	  most	  people,	  how	  to	  go	  on	  living	  where	  they	  are.10	  The	   issue	   Williams	   raises	   is	   not	   just	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   settlement	   tends	   to	  overlook	  the	  consequences	  of	  social	  and	  economic	  change—the	  enforced	  mobility	  of	  disrupted	  populations—but	  that	   there	   is	  a	  kind	  of	  dishonesty	   in	  the	   idealisation	  of	  the	   settled	   community,	   ‘an	   insolent	   indifference	   to	   most	   people’s	   needs’.11	  Traditional	  accounts	  of	  settlement	  depend,	  with	  a	  kind	  of	  pastoral	  nostalgia,	  upon	  a	  view	  of	  abstraction	  and	  social	  complexity	  as	  in	  themselves	  harmful	  that	  leaves	  little	  room	  for	  human	  change.	  Even	  Williams’	  account	  of	  mobile	  privatisation	  invokes	  ‘the	  breakdown	  and	  dissolution	  of	  older	  and	  smaller	  kinds	  of	  settlement	  and	  productive	  labour’,12	  where	  the	  word	  ‘settlement’	  resonates	  with	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  organic	  social	  order.	  The	  structure	  of	  value	  is	  simply	  loaded	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  closed	  group,	  with	  its	  ‘established	   ties	   of	   kinship,	   locality,	   and	   occupation’,13	   into	   which	   the	   stranger	  intrudes.	  
—II Into	   which	   a	   stranger	   intrudes	   whose	   status	   as	   stranger	   is	   created	   by	   the	   closed	  community.	   Strangeness	   is	   the	   opposite	   of	   a	   settled	   condition:	   the	   stranger	   is	   the	  one	  who	   disrupts	   settlement,	   who	   unsettles	   an	   order.	   It	   is	   in	   terms	   of	   taxonomic	  disorder	   that	   both	   Simmel	   and	   Bauman	   characterise	   the	   stranger.14	   For	   Georg	  Simmel,	  the	  stranger	  is	  the	  synthetic	  unity	  of	  wandering	  and	  its	  conceptual	  opposite,	  fixation	  in	  space;	  the	  stranger	  is	  thus	  not	  one	  who	  arrives	  and	  leaves,	  but	  one	  who,	  coming	   to	   stay,	   nevertheless	   remains	   ‘a	   potential	   wanderer:	   although	   he	   has	   not	  moved	   on,	   he	   has	   not	   quite	   overcome	   the	   freedom	   of	   coming	   and	   going’.15	   The	  stranger	  thus	  has	  ‘the	  specific	  character	  of	  mobility’,	  and	  if	  this	  mobility	  takes	  place	  within	   a	   closed	   group	   it	   ‘embodies	   that	   synthesis	   of	   nearness	   and	   distance	  which	  constitutes	   the	   formal	   position	   of	   the	   stranger’.16	   The	   freedom	   of	   entry	   into	   and	  departure	   from	   the	   settled	   group	   enjoyed	   by	   the	   stranger	   has	   as	   its	   counterpart	  indifference	  toward	  him,	  and	  the	  price	  of	  his	  freedom	  is	  thus	  his	  solitude	  within	  the	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crowd.17	  In	  this	  sense	  there	  is	  a	  direct	  correspondence	  between	  the	  stranger	  and	  the	  city,	   since	   in	   the	   complexity	   of	   city	   life	   ‘one	   grows	   accustomed	   to	   continual	  abstractions,	   to	   indifference	   towards	   that	   which	   is	   spatially	   closest	   and	   to	   an	  intimate	  relationship	  to	  that	  which	  is	  spatially	  very	  far	  removed’.18	  One	  has	  only	  an	  abstract	  relation	  to	  the	  stranger,	  since	  ‘with	  the	  stranger	  one	  has	  only	  certain	  more	  general	   qualities	   in	   common,	   whereas	   the	   relation	   to	  more	   organically	   connected	  persons	   is	   based	   on	   the	   commonness	   of	   specific	   differences	   from	  merely	   general	  features’.19	   Simmel’s	   conception	   prefigures	   (and	   doubtless	   flows	   into)	   Sartre’s	  notion	   of	   the	   group	   constituted	   by	   seriality:	   a	   ‘plurality	   of	   isolations’	   united	   by	   a	  common	   but	   abstract	   interest	   (waiting	   in	   a	   queue	   for	   the	   bus,	   for	   example)	   and	  organised	   in	  a	  contingent	  and	  non-­‐reciprocal	   relation	  of	   interchangeability	  of	  each	  with	  each	  Other.20	  Zygmunt	   Bauman	   picks	   up	   on	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   stranger’s	   structural	  ambivalence.	   Social	   organisation	   is	   designed	   to	   reduce	   taxonomic	   ambiguity	   by	  assigning	  boundaries,	  and	  it	  treats	  the	  stranger	  as	  belonging	  to	  an	  order	  which	  is	  not	  yet	   known	   to	   us.	   Yet	   the	   true	   stranger	   is	   not	   merely	   the	   as-­‐yet-­‐undecided,	   the	  unfamiliar,	   but	   is,	   in	   principle,	   an	   undecidable,	   ‘not	   just	   unclassified	   but	  unclassifiable’.21	  In	  a	  world	  divided	  between	  two	  archetypal	  principles	  of	  sociation,	  those	  of	  the	  friend	  and	  the	  enemy,	  the	  stranger	  resembles	  neither	  one,	  or	  rather	  he	  may	  resemble	  either:	  ‘He	  made	  his	  way	  into	  the	  life-­‐world	  uninvited,	  thereby	  casting	  me	  on	  the	  receiving	  side	  of	  his	  initiative,	  making	  me	  into	  the	  object	  of	  his	  action	  of	  which	  he	  is	  the	  subject:	  all	  this	  …	  is	  a	  notorious	  mark	  of	  the	  enemy.	  Yet,	  unlike	  other,	  “straightforward”	  enemies,	  he	  is	  not	  kept	  at	  a	  secure	  distance,	  nor	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	   the	  battleline’.22	  The	   stranger	   is	   thus	   the	  bearer	   of	   incongruity,	   of	   anomaly:	   ‘He	  stands	  between	   friend	  and	  enemy,	  order	  and	   chaos,	   the	   inside	  and	   the	  outside.	  He	  stands	   for	   the	   treacherousness	  of	   friends,	   for	   the	   cunning	  disguise	  of	   the	  enemies,	  for	  fallibility	  of	  order,	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  inside’.23	  	  In	   the	   Imaginary	  Bauman	   is	  exploring	  here,	   the	  stranger	  belongs	  to	   the	  urban	  world	  of	  abstraction	  and	  complexity.	  Where	  the	  ‘dense	  sociability’	  of	  the	  premodern,	  small-­‐scale	  community	  is	  built	  around	  the	  poles	  of	  friendship	  and	  enmity,	  in	  the	  city	  there	   is	   ‘a	   divorce	   between	   physical	   density	   and	   dense	   sociability’.24	   The	   city	  represents	  a	  universalisation	  of	   strangerhood.	  Here	   is	  a	   classic	  nineteenth-­‐century	  description:	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A	   city	   such	   as	   London,	   where	   a	   man	   might	   wander	   for	   hours	   at	   a	   time	  without	   reaching	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   end,	  without	  meeting	   the	   slightest	  hint	  which	   could	   lead	   to	   the	   inference	   that	   there	   is	   open	   country	  within	  reach,	  is	  a	  strange	  thing.	  This	  colossal	  centralization,	  this	  heaping	  together	  of	   two	   and	   a	   half	  million	   human	   beings	   in	   one	   place,	   has	  multiplied	   the	  power	   of	   this	   two	   and	   a	   half	   million	   a	   hundredfold	   …	   But	   the	   sacrifices	  which	  all	  this	  has	  cost	  become	  apparent	  later.	  After	  roaming	  the	  streets	  of	  the	   capital	   for	   a	  day	  or	   two,	  making	  headway	  with	  difficulty	   through	   the	  human	  turmoil	  and	  the	  endless	  lines	  of	  vehicles,	  after	  visiting	  the	  slums	  of	  the	  metropolis,	   one	   realizes	   for	   the	   first	   time	   that	   these	   Londoners	   have	  been	  forced	  to	  sacrifice	  the	  best	  qualities	  of	  their	  human	  nature,	   in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  all	  the	  marvels	  of	  civilization	  which	  crowd	  their	  city	  …	  The	  very	   turmoil	   of	   the	   streets	   has	   something	   repulsive	   about	   it,	   something	  against	  which	  human	  nature	  rebels.	  The	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  from	   every	   class	   and	   rank	   crowding	   past	   each	   other—are	   they	   not	   all	  human	   beings	   with	   the	   same	   qualities	   and	   powers,	   and	   with	   the	   same	  interest	  in	  being	  happy?	   ...	  And	  still	  they	  crowd	  by	  one	  another	  as	  though	  they	   had	   nothing	   in	   common,	   nothing	   to	   do	  with	   one	   another,	   and	   their	  only	   agreement	   is	   the	   tacit	   one	   that	   each	   keep	   to	   his	   own	   side	   of	   the	  pavement,	  so	  as	  not	   to	  delay	   the	  opposing	  stream	  of	   the	  crowd,	  while	  no	  man	   seeks	   to	   honour	   another	   with	   so	   much	   as	   a	   glance.	   The	   brutal	  indifference,	   the	   unfeeling	   isolation	   of	   each	   within	   his	   private	   concerns,	  becomes	  the	  more	  repellent	  and	  offensive	  the	  more	  these	   individuals	  are	  crowded	  together	  in	  a	  limited	  space.25	  The	  crowd	  of	  strangers	  that	  Engels	  here	  describes	  is	  one	  of	  the	  great	  tropes	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  modernity,	  and	  it	  registers	  something	  of	  the	  shock	  that	  the	  loss	  of	  human	  scale	  in	  the	  great	  cities	  of	  industrial	  modernity	  brings	  with	  it.	  Yet	  this	  whole	  dichotomy—the	   traditional	   settlement	   represented	   by	   the	   parish,	   and	   the	   lonely	  crowd	   of	   the	   city—is	   unworkably	   stark.	   The	   parish	   is	   not	   only	   built	   upon	   the	  exclusion	   of	   the	   stranger	   but	   is	   actively	   informed	   by	   the	   excluded	   space	   of	   those	  other	  parishes	   in	  which	  the	  stranger	  has	  the	  status	  of	  a	  native.	  Moreover,	   far	   from	  being	   a	   kind	   of	   essence	   of	   the	   local,	   the	   parish	   is	   shot	   through	   and	   through	  with	  otherness	   and	   abstraction,	   informed	   and	   structured	   by	   the	   shaping	   authority	   of	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religion,	   the	   state,	   capital,	   and	   the	   law.	   Conversely,	   the	   city	   of	  modernity	   is	   never	  simply	   composed	   of	   abstraction	   and	   non-­‐reciprocal	   relations,	   never	   simply	   the	  opposite	  of	  the	  local,	  because	  its	  inhabitants	  work	  tirelessly	  to	  make	  its	  strangeness	  familiar.	   ‘Most	   people’,	   as	   Meaghan	   Morris	   argues,	   ‘still	   participate	   in	   parochial	  circuits	   of	   affect	   and	   belonging:	   family,	   sport,	   and,	   since	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   inhabit	  institutions	   and	   professions	   or	   trades	   in	   parochial	   ways,	   the	   distribution	   of	  employment	   (and	   lack	   of	   it)	   are	   just	   three	   of	   the	   forces	   that	   work	   to	   keep	   us	  grounded	   and	   emotionally	   bounded’.26	   The	   difference	   between	   familiarity	   and	  strangeness	  is	  one	  of	  scale,	  not	  of	  kind.	  Moreover,	  if	  at	  one	  level	  the	  parish	  and	  the	  city	  represent	  very	  different	  forms	  of	   relation	   to	   the	   stranger,	   a	   relation	  of	   exteriority	   and	   a	   relation	  of	   interiority,	   at	  another	  level	  each	  functions	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  exclusion	  of	  otherness.	  Rather	  than	  the	  vagabond,	  the	  key	  forms	  taken	  by	  the	  institutionalised	  stranger	  in	  our	  world	  are	  those	   of	   the	   migrant,	   the	   refugee,	   and	   indigenous	   and	   ethnic	   minorities.	   Bauman	  argues,	   indeed,	   that	   ‘the	   national	   state	   is	   designed	   primarily	   to	   deal	   with	   the	  problem	   of	   strangers,	   not	   enemies’,27	   and	   it	   does	   so	   by	   positing	   as	   a	   norm	   the	  cultural	   homogeneity	   of	   the	   settled	   or	   the	   settlers.	   Yet	   this	   is	   likewise	   too	   simple,	  because	   recognition	   and	   incorporation	   of	   the	   stranger	   is	   an	   important	   function	   of	  the	  nation	  state.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  legal	  migrant	  or	  refugee	  is	  held	  up	  in	  societies	  such	   as	   the	   United	   States	   and	   Australia	   as	   a	   model	   of	   aspirational	   adaptation,	   ‘a	  supplement	  to	  the	  nation,	  an	  agent	  of	  national	  reenchantment	  that	  might	  rescue	  the	  regime	   from	   corruption	   and	   return	   it	   to	   its	   first	   principles’,28	   but	   in	   ways	   that	  preserve	   the	   priority	   of	   the	   home	   culture.	   The	   very	   success	   of	   the	   migrant	   in	  integrating	  into	  their	  adoptive	  home	  reinforces	  the	  liberal	  call	  to	  assimilation	  which	  undermines	   the	   stigmatisation	   of	   the	   stranger	   in	   the	   same	  movement	   in	   which	   it	  also	  undoes	  their	  strangeness.29	  The	  illegal	  migrant	  is	  similarly	  a	  structural	  moment	  of	   countries	   such	   as	   the	   US	   and	   France,	   since,	   as	   Bonnie	   Honig	   argues,	   ‘illegal	  migration	   is	  not	  only	  controlled	  by	  the	  state;	   it	   is	  simultaneously	  enabled,	  covertly	  courted,	   often	   managed,	   and	   certainly	   tolerated	   by	   it.	   Established	   citizens	   profit	  from	  the	  subsidies	  that	  cheap	  migrant	  labour	  provides	  to	  their	  child-­‐care	  costs	  and	  food	   prices’.30	   The	   treatment	   of	   illegal	   migrants,	   including	   refugees,	   differs	   from	  country	  to	  country,	  but	  that	  ambivalence	  (or,	  one	  might	  as	  well	  say,	  that	  hypocrisy)	  is	  characteristic	  of	  most	  Western	  countries.31	  	  
	  John Frow—Settlement	   13 
If	   in	   one	   sense	   every	   politics	   is	   a	   politics	   of	   exclusion	   and	   belonging,	   the	  imperative	   for	  us	  must	  be	   to	  develop	  a	  politics	  based	  on	  a	  relation	   to	   the	  stranger	  which	  is	  neither	  one	  of	  exclusion	  nor	  of	  complete	  absorption.	  The	  starting	  point	  for	  the	   ‘counterpolitics	   of	   foreignness’	   that	   Honig	   envisages	   is	   an	   argument	   that	  ‘democracy	   is	   always	   about	   living	   with	   strangers	   …	   democracy	   is	   about	   being	  mobilised	   into	   action	   periodically	   with	   and	   on	   behalf	   of	   people	   who	   are	   surely	  opaque	  to	  us	  and	  often	  unknown	  to	  us’.32	  The	  stranger	  is	  internal	  to	  the	  polity,	  each	  of	  us	   is	  each	  other’s	  stranger,	  and	   the	  role	  of	   the	  outsider	   then	  becomes	  crucial	   to	  the	   construction	   of	   an	   alternative	   politics.	   Yet	   this	  model,	   admirable	   as	   it	   is	   in	   its	  attempt	  to	  begin	  with	  the	  fact	  of	  strangeness	  rather	  than	  an	  assumed	  commonality,	  nevertheless	   repeats	   that	   assimilative	   move	   of	   the	   liberal	   politics	   of	   diversity:	   a	  move	  based	  on	   ‘our’	   reception	  of	   ‘them’	  and	  on	   considerations	  of	   the	   contribution	  that	  ‘they’	  might	  make	  to	  ‘our’	  polity.	  It’s	  a	  move	  that	  continues	  to	  shape	  Australian	  multiculturalism.	  
—III I	  want	   to	   conclude,	   not	   by	   offering	   anything	   as	   grand	   as	   a	   counterpolitics,	   but	   by	  exploring	   a	   quite	   different	   kind	   of	   representation	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   the	  stranger	  and	  the	  closed	  community.	  My	  text	  is	  a	  drawing	  by	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  Indigenous	  Australian	  artist	  Tommy	  McRae,	  done	  about	  1890	  and	  titled	  Corroboree,	  
or	  William	  Buckley	  and	  Dancers	  from	  the	  Wathaurong	  People	  (figure	  1).	  The	  picture	  is	  inscribed	  on	  paper	  in	  ink	  and	  ochre,	  a	  pigment	  used	  in	  ritual	  body	  ornamentation	  and	   in	   traditional	   bark	   paintings.	   The	   image	   depicts	   the	   escaped	   convict	   William	  Buckley,	   deported	   to	   Australia	   as	   part	   of	   that	   great	   expulsion	   of	   the	   dangerous	  classes	   from	  the	  English	  order	  of	   things	  (an	  expulsion	  to	  which	  the	  Smith	  children	  and	  Philip	  North	  might	  have	  been	  subject	  had	  they	  lived	  at	  a	  later	  time),	  who	  lived	  among	   the	   Indigenous	  Wathaurong	   people	   of	   Victoria	   from	   1803	   to	   1835—‘going	  native’,	  as	  the	  phrase	  has	  it,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  had	  forgotten	  his	  own	  language	  by	  the	  time	  he	  joined	  the	  group	  of	  white	  settler-­‐invaders	  who	  founded	  Melbourne.	  Part	  of	   the	   legend	   that	   has	   grown	   up	   around	   him	   tells	   that	   the	   Aboriginal	   people	   he	  encountered	   took	   him	   for	   their	   ancestor,	  Murrangurk,	   and	   treated	   him	   as	   sacred.	  Most	   representations	   of	   Buckley	   show	   the	   moment	   at	   which	   a	   wild-­‐looking	   man,	  heavily	  	  bearded	  and	  	  dressed	  in	  furs,	  	  encounters	  his	  	  own	  people	  	  again	  	  (that	  figure	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Figure 1: Tommy McRae, Corroboree, or William Buckley and Dancers from the Wathaurong 
People, c. 1890 
Source: University of Melbourne Archives. Reproduced with permission. owes	   much	   to	   representations	   of	   Robinson	   Crusoe);	   this	   image	   is	   unusual	   in	  representing	  Buckley	  living	  among	  the	  Indigenous	  people	  who	  sheltered	  him.	  The	  picture	  is	  made	  up	  of	  two	  planes	  which	  have	  no	  contact	  with	  each	  other.33	  At	   the	   top,	   floating	   like	   the	   transcendental	   kingdom	   of	   God	   in	   an	   early	  mediaeval	  painting,	  is	  a	  fully	  rigged	  ship,	  flags	  streaming	  in	  the	  wind.	  With	  its	  menacing	  aspect	  it	  could	  be	  a	  warship;	  it	  is	  certainly	  an	  alien	  and	  intrusive	  presence	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  dancing	  men,	   a	   figure	   of	   European	   invasion;	   and	   it	  may	   also	   function	   as	   a	   kind	   of	  spatial	  narrative,	  indicating	  the	  convict	  transport	  from	  which	  Buckley	  had	  escaped.	  In	   the	  bottom	  half	  of	   the	  picture,	  we	  see	  a	   row	  of	   thirteen	  dancers,	  one	  white	  and	  twelve	   black—a	   significant	   numerology	   in	   the	   Christian	   tradition.	   Eleven	   of	   the	  black	  dancers	  and	  the	  white	  dancer	  are	  carrying	  small	  flags	  on	  sticks,	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	   they	  seem	  to	  protrude	   from	  their	  heads;	   the	   twelfth	  black	  dancer	  occupies	  an	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anomalous	   space	  at	   the	   far	   right,	   and	   carries	   two	   flags	  on	   sticks	   in	  his	  hands.	  The	  white	  dancer,	  too,	  occupies	  an	  anomalous	  space,	  separated	  from	  the	  dancers	  to	  his	  right	   and	   left	   by	   a	   greater	   space	   than	   is	   to	   be	   found	   between	   the	   black	   dancers.	  Buckley’s	  legs,	  and	  those	  of	  the	  dancer	  to	  his	  left,	  are	  unobscured,	  whereas	  those	  of	  the	  other	  dancers	  overlap	  in	  an	  almost	  geometric	  pattern.	  Despite	   the	   separation	   of	   the	   two	   planes—sea	   and	   land,	   the	   unsettled	   alien	  world	  of	   the	   ship	   and	   indigenous	  belonging—and	  although	   the	  dancers	  have	   their	  backs	  turned	  to	  the	  ship,	  as	  though	  refusing	  everything	  it	  stands	  for,	  several	  features	  tie	   the	   two	   planes	   together.	   The	  most	   obvious	   is	   the	  way	   the	   flags	   carried	   by	   the	  dancers	   repeat	   the	   three	   flags	   streaming	   above	   the	   ship.	   Another	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  Buckley	   is	   wearing	   a	   sailor’s	   hat,	   and	   looks	   almost	   as	   though	   he	   is	   dancing	   a	  hornpipe.	  But	  his	  dancing	  pose,	  with	   legs	  akimbo	  and	  the	  calves	  covered	   in	  brush-­‐like	   leggings,	   is	  not	  that	  of	  the	  hornpipe	  but	  that	  of	  a	  quite	  different	  kind	  of	  dance.	  This	   is	   a	   community	   of	   men	   to	   which	   Buckley	   belongs,	   in	   whose	   ceremonial	  corroboree	   he	   is	   participating	   as	   an	   equal.	   His	   belonging	   is	   that	   of	   a	   stranger,	  someone	  marked	  by	  difference	  of	  colour	  and	  dress	  and	  by	  the	  space	  of	   isolation	  in	  which	  he	  stands.	  Yet	  his	  outcast	  status	  in	  the	  white	  world	  has	  gained	  him	  acceptance	  in	   this	  world;	   he	   is	   at	   once	   a	  member	   of	   it	   and	   slightly	   to	   one	   side	   of	   it,	   perhaps	  even—as	  the	  flags	  and	  the	  sailor’s	  hat	  seem	  to	  indicate—poised	  between	  the	  two.	  Note	   the	   high	   degree	   of	   formalisation	   of	   these	   figures:	   their	   rigid	   stance,	   and	  their	   array	   as	   a	   set	   of	   varied	   repetitions	   within	   a	   pattern.	   The	   major	   point	   of	  variation	   is	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   the	   heads:	   reading	   from	   the	   right,	   the	   first	   three	  figures,	   including	  Buckley,	  are	  looking	  to	  their	  right;	  the	  next	  five	  look	  to	  their	   left,	  then	   two	   to	   the	   right,	   and	   three	   to	   the	   left.	   The	   faces	   are	   all	   in	   full	   profile,	  which	  means	  that	  the	  five	  dancers	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  first	  group	  are	  looking	  at	  Buckley	  and	  his	  two	  immediate	  companions;	  but	  this	  is	  not	  so	  much,	  I	  think,	  about	  relations—of	  looking	   and	   belonging—within	   the	   group	   of	   dancers,	   as	   it	   is	   about	   the	   relation	  between	  the	  dancers	  and	  us	  who	  are	  looking	  at	  them,	  for	  whom	  they	  form	  a	  pictorial	  arrangement—and,	   indeed,	   one	   which	   in	   its	   formalised	   stiffness	   has	   a	   strong	  element	   of	   comedy.	   These,	   we	   could	   say,	   are	   not	   so	   much	   men,	   certainly	   not	  individualised	  men	   (with	   the	  partial	   exception	  of	  Buckley),	   as	   they	   are	   actors	   in	   a	  ceremony.	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In	   the	   complex	   relationships	   it	   sets	   up	   both	  within	   the	   group	   of	   dancers	   and	  between	   the	   dancers	   and	   the	   ship,	   the	   drawing	   unsettles	   and	   complicates	   our	  assumptions	  about	  who	  the	  stranger	  is	  in	  our	  world:	  who	  is	  an	  outsider,	  and	  what	  it	  means	   to	  belong.	  Rather	   than	  showing	  a	  community	  of	   the	  privileged	   in	  which	   the	  unprivileged—the	  migrant,	   the	  refugee—is	  accepted,	   it	  shows	  one	  kind	  of	  outsider	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  those	  other	  outsiders	  who	  have	  been	  removed,	  or	  who	  will	  soon	  be	  removed,	  from	  their	  country.	  Buckley	  is	  multiply	  a	  stranger:	  in	  the	  white	  world	  from	  which	  he	  has	  escaped;	  in	  the	  Aboriginal	  world	  where	  he	  has	  a	  peripheral	  belonging;	  and	  in	  that	  world	  as	  it	  exists	  within	  the	  interstices	  of	  the	  white	  world.	  Even	  within	  this	   community	  of	   dancers,	   however,	   there	   are	  partial	   insiders	   and	  outsiders:	   it	   is	  not	  only	  Buckley	  but	  also	  the	  dancer	  to	  his	   left	  who	  occupy	  an	  anomalous	  space,	  a	  certain	   solitude	   in	   the	   midst	   of	   this	   group.	   McRae	   makes	   it	   clear	   that	   this	   is	   not	  unproblematically	   a	   community;	   we	   might	   invoke	   here	   Ian	   McLean’s	   account	   of	  Bennelong’s	   difficult	   and	   wily	   negotiation	   of	   relations	   between	   Indigenous	  inhabitants	   and	   settler-­‐invaders	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   on	   the	   other	   among	   the	  mutually	   antagonistic	   clans	   of	   the	   Sydney	   Cove	   area	   whom	   he	   persuaded	   into	   a	  settlement	   with	   Governor	   Phillip.34	   Yet	   what	   the	   picture	   offers	   us,	   for	   all	   its	  unblinking	  recognition	  of	  tensions,	   is	  clearly,	  still,	  a	  community,	  and	  we	  could	  read	  the	  image,	  counterfactually,	  as	  a	  vision	  of	  an	  Australia	  in	  which	  white	  men	  had	  been	  accepted,	   almost	   as	   equals,	   by	   its	   Indigenous	   inhabitants.	   The	   ironic	   force	   of	   its	  vision	   of	   community—of	   a	   ‘settlement’	   in	   the	   third	   sense	   of	   that	  word,	   a	   political	  arrangement	   reconciling	   fractious	   groups—lies	   precisely	   in	   its	   counterfactuality.	  This	  is	  what	  might	  have	  been.	  This	  is	  how	  McRae	  in	  1890	  envisaged	  a	  world	  and	  its	  disappearance.35	  And	  this	  is	  how	  we	  might,	  again,	  begin	  to	  imagine	  a	  settlement	  with	  the	  stranger.	   —	  	  John	   Frow	   is	   an	   ARC	   Professorial	   Fellow	   at	   the	   University	   of	   Melbourne	   and	   an	  editor	  of	  Cultural	  Studies	  Review.	  	  	  
	  John Frow—Settlement	   17 
	  
—ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My	  thanks	  to	  Meaghan	  Morris	  for	  inviting	  me	  to	  a	  workshop	  on	  The	  Stranger	  at	  Lingnan	  University,	  Hong	  Kong,	  where	  a	  first	  version	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  presented,	  to	  the	  participants	  in	  that	  workshop	  for	  their	  helpful	  discussion,	  and	  to	  the	  two	  anonymous	  reviewers	  who	  helped	  me	  rethink,	  but	  probably	  not	  to	  solve,	  its	  problems	  of	  design	  and	  conception.	  
—NOTES 1	  Ferdinand	  Tönnies,	  Community	  and	  Society	  (Gemeinschaft	  und	  Gesellschaft),	  trans.	  Charles	  P.	  Loomis,	  ;	  rpt	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  New	  York,	  1963	  (1957).	  2	  Steve	  Hindle,	  On	  the	  Parish?	  The	  Micro-­Politics	  of	  Poor	  Relief	  in	  Rural	  England,	  c.	  1550–1750,	  Clarendon	  Press,	  Oxford,	  2004,	  p.	  227.	  3	  Geoffrey	  W.	  Oxley,	  Poor	  Relief	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  1601–1834,	  David	  and	  Charles,	  Newton	  Abbot	  1974,	  p.	  5.	  4	  Raymond	  Williams,	  The	  Country	  and	  the	  City,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  Oxford,	  1973,	  p.	  84.	  5	  John	  Pound,	  Poverty	  and	  Vagrancy	  in	  Tudor	  England,	  Longman,	  London	  1971,	  p.	  4.	  6	  Poor	  Relief	  Act	  of	  1662,	  14	  Cha	  II	  c.12.	  7	  Elizabeth	  Melling	  (ed.),	  Kentish	  Sources	  IV:	  The	  Poor,	  Kent	  County	  Council,	  Maidstone,	  1964,	  p.	  25.	  8	  Ibid.,	  p.	  24.	  9	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  71–2.	  10	  Williams,	  The	  Country	  and	  the	  City,	  p.	  84.	  11	  Ibid.	  12	  Raymond	  Williams,	  Television:	  Technology	  and	  Cultural	  Form,	  Fontana,	  London,	  1974,	  p.	  26.	  13	  Georg	  Simmel,	  ‘The	  Stranger’,	  The	  Sociology	  of	  Georg	  Simmel,	  trans.	  Kurt	  Wolff,	  Free	  Press,	  New	  York,	  1950,	  p.	  404.	  14	  This	  paragraph	  repeats	  material	  used	  in	  my	  essay	  ‘The	  City	  at	  Human	  Scale’,	  Critical	  Quarterly,	  vol.	  51,	  no.	  4,	  2009,	  pp.	  37–49.	  15	  Simmel,	  ‘The	  Stranger’,	  p.	  402.	  16	  Ibid.,	  pp.	  403–4.	  17	  Georg	  Simmel,	  ‘The	  Metropolis	  and	  Mental	  Life’,	  in	  Simmel	  on	  Culture:	  Selected	  Writings,	  eds	  David	  Frisby	  and	  Mike	  Featherstone,	  Sage,	  London,	  1997,	  p.	  181.	  Simmel’s	  Jewishness	  is	  doubtless	  not	  irrelevant	  to	  his	  analysis	  of	  estrangement.	  18	  Simmel,	  ‘The	  Sociology	  of	  Space’,	  in	  Simmel	  on	  Culture,	  p.	  153.	  19	  Simmel,	  ‘The	  Stranger’,	  p.	  405.	  20	  Jean-­‐Paul	  Sartre,	  Critique	  of	  Dialectical	  Reason	  I:	  Theory	  of	  Practical	  Ensembles,	  trans.	  Alan	  Sheridan-­‐Smith,	  Verso,	  London,	  1982,	  pp.	  256,	  259.	  21	  Zygmunt	  Bauman,	  Modernity	  and	  Ambivalence,	  Polity	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  1991,	  p.	  58.	  22	  Ibid.,	  p.	  59.	  23	  Ibid.,	  p.	  61.	  24	  Ibid.,	  p.	  62.	  25	  Friedrich	  Engels,	  The	  Condition	  of	  the	  Working	  Class	  in	  England	  in	  1844,	  quoted	  in	  Walter	  Benjamin,	  ‘The	  Paris	  of	  the	  Second	  Empire	  in	  Baudelaire’,	  in	  Walter	  Benjamin,	  Selected	  Writings,	  vol.	  4,	  1938–1940,	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  Cambridge,	  Mass,	  2003),	  p.	  33.	  26	  Meaghan	  Morris,	  ‘On	  the	  Future	  of	  Parochialism:	  Globalisation,	  Young	  and	  Dangerous	  IV,	  and	  Cinema	  Studies	  in	  Tuen	  Mun’,	  in	  John	  Hill	  and	  Kevin	  Rocket	  (eds),	  Film	  History	  and	  National	  Cinema:	  Studies	  in	  
Irish	  Film	  II,	  Four	  Courts	  Press,	  Dublin,	  2005,	  p.	  2.	  27	  Bauman,	  p.	  63.	  
	  	   	  VOLUME18 NUMBER1 MAR2012	  18 
	  28	  Bonnie	  Honig,	  Democracy	  and	  the	  Foreigner,	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  Princeton	  NJ,	  2001,	  p.	  74.	  29	  Bauman,	  p.	  69.	  30	  Honig,	  p.	  97.	  31	  Cf.	  Linda	  Bosniak,	  The	  Citizen	  and	  the	  Alien:	  Dilemmas	  of	  Contemporary	  Membership,	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  Princeton	  NJ,	  2006,	  for	  an	  insightful	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues.	  32	  Honig,	  p.	  39.	  33	  Nicholas	  Thomas	  suggests	  that	  ‘it	  is	  not	  even	  clear	  that	  these	  images	  are	  intended	  to	  constitute	  one	  composition’,	  although	  whether	  it	  is	  even	  possible	  to	  dissociate	  the	  two	  planes	  entirely	  is	  a	  perhaps	  unanswerable	  question.	  Nicholas	  Thomas,	  ‘Aboriginal	  Artists	  of	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century’	  (review	  of	  Andrew	  Sayers,	  Aboriginal	  Artists	  of	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century),	  Oceania,	  vol.	  66,	  no.	  4,	  1996,	  p.	  331.	  34	  Ian	  McLean,	  ‘Bennelong’s	  Gambit:	  The	  Aboriginal	  Invention	  of	  Modernism’,	  in	  Renata	  Summo-­‐O’Connell	  (ed.),	  Imagined	  Australia:	  Reflections	  Around	  the	  Reciprocal	  Construction	  of	  Identity	  Between	  
Australia	  and	  Europe,	  Peter	  Lang,	  Bern,	  2009,	  pp.	  187–99.	  The	  first	  Australian	  parishes	  were	  established	  in	  Sydney	  and	  Parramatta	  in	  1802	  and	  were	  a	  central	  part	  of	  Sydney’s	  transition	  from	  penal	  colony	  to	  colony.	  35	  Cf.	  Andrew	  Sayers,	  ‘McRae,	  Tommy	  (c.	  1835–1901)’,	  Australian	  Dictionary	  of	  Biography,	  Supplementary	  Volume,	  Melbourne	  University	  Press,	  Melbourne,	  2005,	  pp.	  256–7,	  for	  a	  fuller	  account	  of	  McRae’s	  relation	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  pastoral	  settler	  society	  in	  his	  country.	  
